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Static and Dynamic Concepts of the
Law of Unfair Competition
IRVIN

H. FATHCHILD*
I.

A fundamental difference in basic concept will, of course, result in substantial difference in ultimate conclusion. Nowhere is this more strikingly
evident than in the law of unfair competition. Some authorities tell us that
this branch of the law is but "a single narrow concept-that of passing off
goods as the goods of another."' Others tell us, however, that it is an embodiment of "fundamental principles, applicable here as elsewhere, [that]
when the rights or privileges of the one are liable to conflict with those of
the other, each party is under a duty so to conduct its own business as not
unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that of the other." 2
The divergence in conclusion resulting from this fundamental difference
in basic concept is markedly exemplified in decisions dealing with false advertising. Thus we find the narrow concept applied in a case decided by one of
the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal composed of as illustrious a group
of justices as ever sat upon any such Court, namely, Justices Taft, Lurton,
and Day, all of whom were later appointed to the Supreme Court. In a
unanimous decision by those Justices it was held in American Wvashboard Co.
v. Saginaw Mfg. Co.,3 that the manufacturer of an aluminum-faced washboard was without remedy against another manufacturer who falsely represented that his own washboards were of aluminum. The defendant was not
"palming off its goods on the public as and for the goods of complainant"
[italics the writer's] and relief was, accordingly, denied.
Another Circuit Court of Appeals, however, in the case of Ely-Norris
Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 4 applied the broad concept and sustained a bill
of complaint by a manufacturer of safes who alleged that his safes had ex*Member of the Chicago Bar; Member of Committee on Federal and State TradeMark Legislation in the Patent, Trade-Mark and Copyright Law Section of the American
Bar Association; Chairman of the Trade-Mark Committee in the Patent and Trade-Mark
Section of the Illinois State Bar Association; articles and notes in legal periodicals, including this Review.
1. McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 274;
see Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 531 (1935).
2. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 235 (1918).
3. 103 Fed. 281 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900).
4. 7 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).

(299)
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plosion chambers therein as a protection against burglars and that the
defendant falsely advertised that its safes had such devices therein. Judge
Learned Hand, in delivering the opinion for the Court, said:
". .. there is no part of the law which is more plastic than
unfair competition, and what was not reckoned an actionable
wrong 25 years ago may have become such today. We find it
impossible to deny the strength of the plaintiff's case on the allegations of its bill. . . . It is as unlawful to lie about the quality of
one's wares as about their maker; . . . [Italics the writer's.]
In view of this divergence in conclusion among Circuit Courts of Appeal,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the latter case and upon consideration thereof, reversed the decision of the Second Circuit. 5
This result may appear to reflect an avowal of the narrow concept-and
some have so regarded it.6 Nevertheless, in the Associated Press case,
cited above, 7 the Supreme Court expressly repudiated the narrow concept
and adopted the broad concept as the basis of the decision. There is no
equivocation in the following pronouncements:
"It is said that the elements of unfair competition are lacking
because there is no attempt by the defendant to palm off its goods
as those of the complainant, characteristic of the most familiar, if
not the most typical, cases of unfair competition. Howe Scale Co.
v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U. S. 118, 140. But we cannot
concede that the right to equitable relief is confined to that class of
8
cases."
"The parties are competitors in this field; and on fundamental
principles, applicable here as elsewhere, when the rights or privileges
of the one are liable to conflict with those of the other, each party is
under a duty so to conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or
unfairly to injure that of the other. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 254. Obviously, the question of what is
unfair competition in business must be determined with particular
reference to the character and circumstances of the business." 9
While that decision has been regarded as definitely establishing the
broad concept," that conclusion is beclouded by the result in the later decision, the Mosler Safe case, referred to above. Furthermore, in its most
recent discussion of the subject, the Court appears again to avow the narrow
concept as the basic fundamental, with the decision in the Associated Press
case as an unexplained extension."

5.

Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U. S. 132 (1927).

6. McLaughlin, loc. cit. supra note 1. But see Handler, False and Misleading Jdvertising (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 22.

7. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 235 (1918).
8. Id. at 241.
9.

Id. at 235.

10.

32

HARv.

11.

Rogers, Unfair Competition (1919) 17 MiCH. L. REV. 490; Comment (1919)
L. REV. 566; Nims, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS (3d ed. 1929) 6.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 531 (1935).
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Until this basic conflict or doubt as to the fundamental concept of the
law of unfair competition is settled, we shall continue to find substantial
divergence in results. An inquiry toward the determination of that question
is, therefore, in order.
II.
Here, as elsewhere, historical perspective does much to clarify our view.
Mr. Nims has truly said that, "The development of these rules now defined
as 'Unfair Competition,' is one of the romances of legal history .. ."12
In an earlier article, the writer has sought to determine the origin of this
branch of the law and to thread our way down to the present time.13 The
citations there detailed demonstrate one thing, at least, and that is the
amazing recentness of all this. The early common law digests and writers,
even as late as Blackstone, tell us nothing about any "law of unfair competition"-not even about a "law of trade-marks." While we find recorded a
case at the end of the sixteenth century where the common law action of
deceit was allowed for counterfeiting a trade-mark, nevertheless, as late as
the middle of the eighteenth century, the courts of equity were unwilling to
"restrain one trader from using the same mark with another. 1 4 Indeed, as
late as 1847 the law courts were still unsettled as to whether there was a
legal right, as such, in a trade-mark so that the mere adverse use thereof,
in the absence of actual proof of damages, would entitle the plaintiff to judgment for nominal damages. 5 Judge Duer tells us in 1849, that while trademark proprietors had a remedy in the law courts in earlier times, "it is
certain that the jurisdiction, in relation to such marks, that courts of equity
now exercise, is of recent origin."16 And as late as 1885, the leading contemporary authority in this field, said:
"It is probable that no other branch of legal science has had a
more rapid growth during the twelve years since the first edition
appeared. For that reason, this book had, for the greater part,
' 7
to be rewritten. 1
When once the courts of equity were granting relief against trade-mark
infringement, as such, it was an easy step to grant relief also where the defendant sought to "palm off" his goods as those of the plaintiff by any other
means. This step in the development is beautifully illustrated in a case
decided in 1883 by the Kentucky Court of Appeals." There the defendant
had been most careful not to use or imitate the plaintiff's trade-marks, but
had endeavored to simulate the appearance of the plaintiff's product. The
lower court denied relief-there was no infringement of a trade-mark. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed that decision and granted relief.

12. NIMs,

UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS (3d ed. 1929) 2.
13. Fathchild, Statutory Unfair Competition (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 20, 21, reprinted
with supplemental annotations in (1936) 31 BULL. U. S. TRADE-MARK ASSN., 83, 84.
14. Lord Hardwicke in Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484 (1742).
15. Fathchild, loc. cit. supra note 13.
16. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 599, 604 (1849).

17.

BROWNE, TRADE-MARKS

18.

Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 4 Ky. L. Rep. 759, 81 Ky. 73 (1883).

(2d ed. 1885) Preface.
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That decision is noteworthy not alone for its actual result, but also
because of the broad fundamental concept recognized by the Court as underlying this entire subject matter. Chief Justice Hargis, in delivering the
opinion of the Court, said:
"The object of trade-mark law is to prevent one person from
selling his goods as those of another, to the injury of the latter and
of the public. It grew out of the philosophy of the general rule
that every man should so use his own property and rights as not to
injure the property or rights of another, unless some priority of
right or emergency exist to justify a necessarily different manner
of use."' 9
And further in the opinion the Court held that it was unlawful by any
deceptive means, whether by way of trade-mark infringement or otherwise,

". .. to cause the goods or articles to which they are attached to be purchased by the public as the make or manufacture
of another; thus violating that great generic rule which lies at the
foundation of all law, that a man must so use his own property as
not to injure the property of another." 2
Thus here in the very beginnings of the "palming off" rule, we find declared as the underlying principle of this entire subject matter that broad
fundamental concept which, thirty-five years later, was avowed by the
2
Supreme Court in the Associated Press case. 1
These analogous rights thus established were for a time, for want of a
name, referred to merely as "rights analogous to those of trademarks."
They were so referred to, and classified by Browne, the leading authority
in the early development of this branch of the law. 22 But things soon
acquire names; and the history of the name is as engaging as the history of
the subject. The name "unfair competition" was not the result of analytical
selection. It arose in the course of the consideration of these cases first as
a natural characterization of the conduct in question, and then, by increasing
concurrence of use, became the accepted designation of this branch of the law.
Thus as early as 1803, Lord Eldon, in granting relief against the simulation of the plaintiff's magazine, said:
"If there is a fair competition by another original work, really
new, be the loss what it may, there is no damage or injury."' '
[Italics the writer's.]
In 1849, Judge Duer, in the case already referred to, in answering Lord
Hardwicke's objection 24 that granting relief against the adverse use of a
trade-mark "would be of mischievous consequence," said:

19. Id. at 762, 81 Ky. 84.
20. Id. at 776, 81 Ky. 102.
21.

See supra, p. 299.

22. BROWNE, TRADE-MARKS (1st ed. 1873) c. XII; id. (2d ed. 1898) c. XII.
23. Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215, 225 (1803).
24. In Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484 (1742).
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"It is a mistake to suppose that this necessary protection can
operate as an injurious restraint upon the freedom of trade. Its
direct tendency is to produce and encourage a competition by which
the interests of the public are sure to be promoted; a competition
that stimulates effort and leads to excellence from the certainty of
an adequate reward."25 [Italics the writer's.]
In Browne's first edition of his Trade-Marks published in 1873, while
we do not find any chapter or section heading or even an index reference
on "unfair competition," we do find the following:
"Sec. 42. Wherein consists the wrong in using the Trade-Mark
of 1nother.-It is not in imitation a symbol, device, or fancy name,
for in such act may not be involved the slightest turpitude. The
wrong consists in unfair means to obtain from a person the fruits of
his own ingenuity or industry...
"216 (Italics the writer's).
We there find also such expressions as: "honest competition," 27 "illicit
competition,"' - "competition in business by unfair means, '"29 and "unfair
competition."3 0
Twelve years later, however, in Browne's second edition, we find not
only such usages as above quoted, but also an index reference heading "unfair competition" and the following significant section in the text:
"Sec. 43. Unfair Competition in Business.-In examining cases
classified in digests and books of reports as those of trade-marks, the
reader is sometimes puzzled. In the absence of the slightest evidence that technical trade-marks have been infringed, courts of
equity have granted full and complete redress for an improper use
of labels, wrappers, bill-heads, signs, or other things that are essentially publici juris . . . French-speaking nations have a
standard name for this kind of wrong. The term used is concurrence d~loyale. This term may fairly be Anglicized as a dishonest,
treacherous, perfidious rivalry in trade. In the German Imperial
Court of Colmar, in 1873, the court said that current jurisprudence
understands by concurrence dloyale all manoeuvres that cause prejudice to the name of a property, to the renown of a merchandise,
or in lessening the custom due to rivals in business. The euphemism
employed as a head to this section will answer the present purpose."'"
This outgrowth of the term "unfair competition" from the law of trademarks is reflected also in our digests and encyclopedias of law. As late as
thirty years ago the title heading was still "Trade-marks and Trade Names;"
later, "Trade-marks, Trade Names, Etc.;" and more recently "Trade''
Marks, Trade-Names and Unfair Competition. 32
25.

Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep., 599, 605 (1849).

26.

BROWNE, TRADE-MARKS

27.

Id. at 43.

28.

Id. at 50.

29.

Id. at 51.

30.

Id. at 410.

31.

Id. (2d ed. 1885) § 43.
26 THIRD DEc. DIG. 282 (1929).

32.

(1st ed. 1873) 30.
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While the name has been criticized-Mr. McLaughlin of the Harvard
Law School objecting that the word "unfair" is fraught with emotional
instability,n and Mr. Nims that the word "competition" has misled the
Courts into unnecessarily restrictive applications'4--it appears to have become established not only in the jurisprudence of our own country, but also
in that of other nations and in international covenants. 35
Furthermore, in our view-while not disagreeing with the criticism
that the word "unfair" is of variable content depending upon the economic
and social philosophy of the person using it-that word has been a significant
factor in the subsequent development of this branch of the law. The romance did not end with the establishment of the name. In 1918 the Supreme
Court announced the following paradox:
"The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of
unfair competition." 6 [Italics the writer's.)
Nor is this statement at all inaccurate. When once the name had
become a part of the law, its breadth readily enabled it to draw upon substantive sources other than the law of trade-marks in the establishment of
a comprehensive code of "fair dealing" governing all competitive or other
economic enterprise. Thus, the law of libel and slander and other fields of
tort liability were drawn upon. 7 "In every contract," it is said, "there
exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."3
[Italics the
writer's.] Indeed, even the criminal law has been drawn upon so that its
violations adversely affecting a competitor have been held enjoinable as
"unfair competition."39 The process has not been merely a physical transposition, but a fusion of legal and equitable considerations into new corollaries
in the law of unfair competition. Thus while the rule of respondeat superior
may be sufficient to render the employer legally liable for the slanderous
statements of the employee, it is not necessarily sufficient to establish unfair
competition. 40
Mr. Nims caught the trend of this development when he said:
"The law of Unfair Competition might well be called the book
of rules of the business game. It gives far greater protection
against unfair practices used in competition than is realized by the
average business man. It is still in its infancy. Its possibilities of
41
growth and effectiveness are almost unlimited."
33.

McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 274.

34. NIMS,

UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS

(3d ed. 1929) 1; cf. Federal

Trade Comm. v. Raladam, 283 U. S. 643 (1931).
35. DAVIES, TRUST LAWS
supra note 13, at 20.

AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

(1915) 529 et seq.; Fathchild,

36. United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 97 (1918).
37. See Handler, Unfair Competition (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 196 et seq.
38. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 81 F. (2d) 373, 377 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936),
cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 835 (1936), applying quotation from Kirke LaShelle Co. v
Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N. Y. 79, 188 N. E. 163, 167 (1937).
39. Comment (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 693; Comment (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 1088
(1934) 13 TEx. L. REv. 136.
40. Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co., 82 F. (2d) 468 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
41.

NIMS, UNeFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS
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In light of this perspective we cannot concur in the view that the "palming off"' rule is the sum and substance of the law of unfair competition, or
even that that was so "at common law."142

At common law, as that phrase

is usually understood, there was no law of unfair competition. Wholly aside
from the fact that most of this development was in the courts of equity, 43
this whole subject matter is relatively recent and is only in the early stages
of its growth. The narrow concept mistakes application for principlecorollary for proposition-and makes static that which is a dynamic fundamental in the law. We subscribe unreservedly to the view expressed by
Mr. Nims, that,
"The legal wrong called Unfair Competition exists wherever
' 44
unfair means are used in trade.
III.

But settling the basic concept does not necessarily settle all of our
problems. Indeed, the adoption of the broad concept makes our problems
of application all the more numerous. What are "unfair means?" And by
what process or formula shall we proceed to determine that question?
This problem is doubly complex. The word "unfair" not only presents
an objective indefiniteness but also, as stated by Mr. McLaughlin in the
criticism already referred to, "has emotional and ethical implications peculiarly subject to the economic bias of the person using the term." 45
This situation, however, is not without precedent. The Courts of
Chancery were instituted some centuries ago to do "equity" but without an
investiture of ritual or creed to guide them. And with like criticism, John
Selden, one of the great English lawyers of the seventeenth century, said: 4
"Equity in law is the same that the spirit is in religion, what
every one pleases to make it. .

.

. For law we have a measure,

know what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him
that is chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity."
But the dynamic charge "to do equity" did much, we believe, to carry
the law forward in necessary adjustment to changed and changing conditions.
And so here, the general charge to require "fair dealing" in all competitive or
other economic activity has done, and is doing, much to carry the law forward in closer synchronism with the onrush of change in economic conditions.
In both cases the general reluctance of the judiciary to step beyond established precedent-even the Chancery courts soon adopted the maxim that
"equity follows the law"--and the inherent conservatism ofjudicial temperament should be sufficient protection against emotional divergencies from the
course of sound progress.

42. McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods (1936) 21 IOWA L. REv. 274;
see Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S.495, 531 (1935).
43. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. 599, 604 (1849); see also
Associated Press Case, 248 U. S. 215, 240, 262 (1918).
44.

Nims, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS

(3d ed. 1929) 2.

45. McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 274.
46. SELDEN'S TABLE TALK (Reynold's ed. 1892) 60.
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The question still remains, however, how shall we proceed to determine
what constitutes "unfair means." To decide the successive cases, as they
arise, merely upon the persuasions of the moment is likely to result in haphazard conclusions with high probability of error. Some antecedent formulation of principles to govern the application of this broad concept is highly
desirable. Even the early Chancery courts soon formulated a group of
maxims to guide their decision.
In a previous article appearing in this Review, this writer said:
". .. even if the courts were willing to go forward in exact
synchronism with the 'march of time,' still there may be fields of alleged unfairness into which the courts may properly refuse to enter
until the legislative branch of the government has delineated the
substantive rights in the matter. We suggest the following:
(1) The alleged unfairness may be in a subject-matter which is inherently, or has become, a domain exclusively for legislative
action, and should, accordingly, be left for such action.
(2) Also, the courts may properly be unwilling to give effect to a
proffered trade standard, the soundness of which may well be
open to debate. Proffered standards, the soundness of
which, in an organized community, may properly be debated
should be given effect, if at all, only by legislative action, not
by judicial decision.
(3) And again, as emphasized by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent in the Associated Press case, above-considered, the alleged unfairness may present a complexity of interests which
can more readily be adjusted and supervised by legislative
47
action rather than by judicial process."
These suggestions find support in the citations considered in the previous article and are illustrated also in a number of more recent cases. Thus
in Gruelle v. Mollye's Doll Outfitters, Inc.,4 the successor to the alleged rights
of the "Raggedy Ann" doll sought to enjoin the defendants from manufacturing and selling dolls of the same design and appearance and under the
same name. In denying relief, the court said:
"In view of the ample protection of the copyright laws to meet
a situation of this kind there seems to be no reason to advance into
new territory and I shall not do so."
Here was a legislative subject-matter-copyright protection. Congress,
pursuant to the Constitution, has provided for monopolistic privileges upon
the performance of certain conditions precedent. Those prerequisites having
been specified, it is hardly within the province of the courts to nullify or
change them. Change, if any is to be made in this branch of the law, should
be by legislative action-not by judicial decision.

47.

FATHCHILD,

48.

26

supra note 13, at 27.

TRADE-MARK

RaP. 532 (U. S. D. C. E. D. Pa., July 23, 1936).
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This decision is in line with the ultimate conclusion of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, considered in the previous article mentioned,
that under the "unfair competition" jurisdiction, the courts should not
undertake to modify the substantive patent law-that being a legislative
49
subject-matter.
In Hoeltke v. Kemp Mfg. Co.,50 one of the Circuit Court of Appeals
awarded recovery for the defendant's manufacture and sale of the invented
device priorto the grant of the patent where the invention had been exhibited
to the defendant prior to such manufacture and sale for purposes of negotiating sale or license of the invention. While patents are a legislative
subject-matter, the patent statutes do not profess to deal with the inventor's
substantive status prior to the grant of the patent-it being recognized by
Congress and the courts that the inventor's rights in his invention prior to
the grant of the patent are to be determined by the non-statutory law.
The standard of conduct enunciated in this decision is, of course, hardly
subject to debate and, therefore, is properly within the realm of judicial
recognition and enforcement.
This result may be compared with a recent decision of one of the New
York courts where the plaintiff had written a play for motion picture production, entitled "Inflation," and had exhibited the play to the defendants
for purposes of sale or license. The defendants did not accept plaintiff's
production, but shortly thereafter produced one of their own origination
but under the same title. In denying an injunction, the court said:
". . . Inflation was a common subject on almost every tongue
and pen . . . It is not at all inconceivable that the defendants,
after learning that the plaintiffs had produced a picture on inflation
decided to do likewise. They had a perfect right to do so, just as a
writer who, after seeing an article or a book on a given timely subject, is licensed to write on the identical topic. . . . It is unfortunate for the plaintiffs that their picture could not remain the sole
picture on the subj ect of inflation; but more than that is necessary to
make out a case. Competition alone is not enough; unfairness must
attend the rivalry.""1
The difference between the Hoeltke case and the Whitman case is rather
clear, but the precise dividing line between their respective fields of application is not so clear. As said by Mr. Handler of the Columbia University
Law School:
"To brand every taking a misappropriation or piracy is to beg
the issue.

49. FATHCHILD, supra Note 13, at 31-33.
50. 80 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936); similarly see Booth v. Stutz Motor Car
Co., 56 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co.,
36 F. (2d) 623 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
51. Whitman v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 289 N. Y. Supp. 961 (1936); similarly
see Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
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"The right to compete means the right to imitate. Otherwise,
the first tradesman who wrapped wax paper about a loaf of bread
or who bottled milk would enjoy' the exclusive rights to these
methods of distribution. How long would these exclusive rights
endure? A court cannot restrain a tradesman from copying a style,
design, or the shape and appearance of an article without according
a monopoly to the first user. For one to reap with impunity the
fruits of another's labor may be reprehensible, but the creation of
new species of property interests and new series of monopolies by
the courts may be disastrous to free enterprise.
"It is not to be wondered, therefore, that the courts have found
the problems arising out of the appropriation of competitors' intangible trade values the most perplexing of those encountered in
the law of unfair competition."' '
In the previous article by this writer already referred to, 53 reference
was made to a decision of one of the trial courts in Illinois," where under the
jurisdiction to prevent "unfair competition," the court fixed certain minimum
prices in the barbers' trade in Chicago. In a similar case, the court fixed minimum prices for the dry-cleaning industry in the Chicago area and enjoined
the parties from charging less than the prices so fixed. The propriety of
this decision has since been considered by the Illinois Appellate Court, and
the decree reversed, in Cleaning . . . Ass'n v. Sterling Cleaners & Dyers."
The Court said:
"The court by its mandatory injunction compels all the parties,
both plaintiffs and defendants, to this suit, constituting nearly all
of the cleaning and dyeing plant owners in Chicago and vicinity, to
observe the prices fixed for the industry by the decree, ostensibly
for the purpose ot eliminating so-called 'unfair competition' . . .
"Competition is not of itself a violation of any right of one
engaged in a like business ...
"Fair competition as applied to business covers a wide range.
The fact that there are sales for less than those of a like business is
not of itself unfair. In order to determine the purpose it is necessary
to consider the facts and circumstances concerning such competition, and the court will consider such facts and the reason for cutting
the price, and if the court finds that such price cutting is for the
primary purpose of destroying the competing business, then such
purpose is not fair competition ...
"The case simmers itself down to whether the facts justify
such competition as is evident from the record, and in a general
way the plaintiffs do not deny that competition is necessary.

Handler, Unfair Competition (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 189.
FATHCHILD, supra note 13, at 25.
Docket No. 34
54. Master Barbers' Ass'n v. Jos Baiata, Sup. Ct. Cook Co., Ill.,
S-18528.
55. 285 I1. App. 336 (1936).
52.
53.
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"The plaintiffs do contend, however, that-'Freedom of contract is no longer a dogma but a problem. The question is not
whether freedom of contract should be abolished; nor how much
freedom must be allowed the individual on principle, because of his
natural inalienable etc. rights; but how must and should the sphere

of freedom of the individual be formulated in view of the factual
conditions and the changing needs of social economic life.'
"In the case of John D. Parks & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153
Fed. 24, what was said by the court is a fitting reply to the plaintiff's contention in the instant case, and we cite it with approval.
" 'It has been suggested that we should have regard to new
commercial conditions and a tendency toward a relaxation of old
common-law principles which tend to prevent development on
modern lines. This is an argument better addressed to legislative
bodies than to the courts. Neither is it wise for the courts to
countenance the introduction of artificial distinctions dependent
upon the variant economic views of individual judges. . . .' ,,-6
This decision is eminently sound. Standards of economic, social or
moral policy on which there may properly be differences of opinion in the
community should be determined by legislative action, not by judicial
decision. Furthermore, in view of the complexity of the problem including
the need for continuing administration in any such regulatory program, the
subject-matter should be left for comprehensive legislative action.
The recent decision in Motor Improvements, Inc., v. A. C. Spark Plug
Co.,57 in which the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, 8 goes far to correct
the results of the American Washboard and Ely-Norris Safe cases. In the
Spark Plug case, the defendant had manufactured and sold an oil filter for
automobiles, which, prior to the instant litigation, had been held to infringe
the patents relied upon by the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant changed

the internal construction of its filters so as to avoid the charge of patent
infringement, but represented to the public that the device was the same as
the earlier infringing device. The lower court held that "such representation, in the absence of a showing that the appellee's filter was palmed off on
the public as the appellant's, did not constitute unfair competition . . ."I'
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and directed an injunction and
accounting. The court definitely rejected the position "that the palming
off by one competitor of his goods as those of another is the sole test of unfair competition," and significantly cited with approval Judge Hand's decision in the Court of Appeals in the Ely-Norris Safe case---rejecting the
American Washboard case as not applicable. 0

56.

Id. at 349-358.

57.
58.
59.
60.

80 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
A. C. Spark Plug Co. v. Motor Improvements, Inc., 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 939 (1936).
80 F. (2d) 385-386 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
Id. at 386.
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The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, while technically not an
affirmance, may fairly be taken as an indication that the Court does not
regard its reversal of Judge Hand's decision on the Ely-Norris Safe case as
a disavowal of the broad concept announced in the Associated Press decision,
but solely as a ruling that the plaintiff in these cases must show that he,
individually, rather than possibly as one of a group, is being damaged. But,
as so interpreted, the decision is in conflict with other rulings where group
damage has been recognized as a basis for representative action by individuals in the group."'
We come finally to the recent decision by the Court of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit, in the case of the Associated Press v. KJOS Inc. 62

In this case, the

Court of Appeals in purported application of the Associated Press decision,
already considered, held that a radio broadcasting station which as one of
its features conducted a "Newspaper of the Air" could be restrained by the
Associated Press from broadcasting news reports published by member newspapers in the locality of the station.
The facts in this later case are clearly different from those in the earlier
case, but whether those differences are of consequence is another question.
In the first place, the defendant in the earlier case was a competing newsgathering agency. In the later case the defendant was not a news-gathering
agency, as such, but a radio broadcasting station at a local point of news
distribution. Also, the practice involved in the earlier case was the picking
up of published news items in distant eastern points and transmitting them
to western points, where the papers served by the defendant organization
could publish them at about the same time as the items were published in
3
the papers there served by the plaintiff.1
These differences call for reflection. If a radio station at a point of news
distribution is to be prevented from broadcasting news items published by
newspapers in the locality of that point of distribution, how far will this extrastatutorial judge-made monopoly be carried? Is everyone to be precluded
from using news reports for purposes of profit? What of the news commentators, such as Mr. Boake Carter? And what of the late Will Rogers who
frankly confessed that all he knew was what he read in the papers-and
made a fortune out of it?
Even if we agree with the result in the earlier case, the decision in the
later case is not a necessary deduction therefrom. But if we may be permitted to approach this particular subject-matter from the point of view of
our suggestions hereinabove set forth, we submit the following:
Newspapers are accorded the privileges of copyright protection;6 4 and
such protection is quite generally utilized. It was undoubtedly utilized by
the publications here involved. The situation considered and ruled upon

61.
284 U. S.
62.
63.
64.

Harvey v. American Coal Co., 50 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied,
669 (1931).
80 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
See 245 Fed. 244, 246 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
17 U. S. C. A. § 5 (b).
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in the earlier case may indeed be adequately covered by the copyright law."
If not, the subject-matter being legislative in character, 61 change, if any, in
the substantive scope of that law should be made by legislative action and
not by judicial decision. Furthermore, as a standard of trade practice, the
position taken in the earlier case is perhaps debatable, but clearly so in the
later case. And, finally, the complex questions of public and private interests involved, questions also of the scope of adjustment in related or
other industries and problems of administration perhaps makes the situation
one where change, if any, should be by a comprehensive legislative plan,
not by intermittent judicial action.
The Supreme Court having granted certiorari in the later case, 67 an
opportunity is afforded for further consideration of this subject-matter and
the underlying fundamentals. While our point of view in making these suggestions is, of course, strictly professional, not partisan (being in no wise
interested in this Associated Press litigation or in the particular issues therein presented), we frankly recognize that that very fact may completely disqualify us-we may not have been pushed far enough into those records to
form an intelligent conclusion thereon. We, therefore, respectfully leave the
subject-matter where, in any event, it must always finally repose, in the
hands of the Supreme Court.

65.
66.
210 U. S.
67.

See 6 R. C. L. 1143, par. 62.
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244 (1888); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker,
356 (1908).
KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 938 (1935).
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